MILITARY RESERVIST-EMPLOYEES' RIGHTS
UNDER 38 U.S.C. § 2021(b) (3)-WHAT IS AN
INCIDENT OR ADVANTAGE OF
EMPLOYMENT?

Employee-reservists are protected from certain disadvantages
in their civilian employment by 38 U.S.C. § 2021(b) (3). A recent
Supreme Court decision interprets that section as applying only
to intentional employer discrimination. Whether the reservist is
still entitled to any statutory incidents and advantages of employment depends on how federal courts apply the Supreme
Court's test of equality vis-&-vis fellow employees without military obligations. The effects of the Court'srestrictive holding may
prove adverse to the national defense posture, to the viability of
the all-volunteerforces concept, and to other statutoryprotections
afforded employee-reservists.

INTRODUCTION
Workers in the private sector who have military Reserve or National Guard obligations are subject to on-the-job discrimination

by their civilian employers, along with inherent disadvantages associated with their military commitments, such as diminished civilian take-home pay. Section 2021(b) (3)1 of the Vietnam Era
Veterans' Readjustment Act of 19742 protects these employees by

providing that they be afforded all the benefits of employment
that their non-military co-workers enjoy. Since its enactment in

1968, the primary focus of litigation under section 2021(b) (3) has
revolved around what constitutes a protected statutory incident
1. See 38 U.S.C. § 2021(b) (3) (1976), which provides:
Any person who [is employed either by the federal or a state government,
or by a private employer] shall not be denied retention in employment or
any promotion or other incident or advantage of employment because of
any obligation as a member of a Reserve component of the Armed Forces.
Section 2021(b) (3) is applicable to both reservists and National Guardsmen. See
infra note 20 and accompanying text.
2. 38 U.S.C. §§ 2011-2026 (1976).
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or advantage of employment. Federal court decisions have included in that category such rights as: paid holidays,3 equal opportunity to work overtime, 4 and stability in job classification and
duties. 5
The issue of whether a forty-hour work week is a statutory incident or advantage of employment arose in the context of whether
an employer is required to take reasonable steps to accommodate
a reservist's weekend military duties by changing work schedules.
In West v. Safeway Stores, Inc.6 and Monroe v. StandardOil Co.,7

the Fifth and Sixth Circuits concluded under similar facts that a
forty-hour work week is an incident or advantage of employment.
West held that an employer was under a statutory duty to take
reasonable steps to make scheduling accommodations for employee-reservists. Monroe held, however, that section 2021(b) (3)
required only "that reservists be treated equally or neutrally with
their fellow employees without military obligations."8 No affirmative action was required by the employer. The Sixth Circuit's ruling classified military absences in the same category as -personal
leaves of absence.
To resolve the conflict between the circuits, the Supreme Court
granted Monroe certiorari.9 In a five to four decision,O the Court
affirmed the judgment of the Sixth Circuit." The majority opin3. See, e.g., Kidder v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 469 F. Supp. 1060 (S.D. Fla. 1978).
4. See, e.g., Carney v. Cummins Engine Co., 602 F.2d 763 (7th Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 1073 (1980); Lott v. Goodyear Aerospace Corp., 395 F. Supp. 866
(N.D. Ohio 1975). Contra Breeding v. TRW, Inc., 477 F. Supp. 1177 (M.D. Tenn.
1979).
5. See, e.g., Carlson v. New Hampshire Dep't of Safety, 609 F.2d 1024 (1st Cir.
1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 913 (1980).
6. 609 F.2d 147 (5th Cir. 1980).
7. 613 F.2d 641 (6th Cir. 1980), af'd, 452 U.S. 549 (1981).
8. Id. at 646.
9. Monroe v. Standard Oil Co., 452 U.S. 549 (1981). Petitioner Monroe was a
rotational shift employee at respondent's refinery. His work schedule repeatedly
conflicted with his weekend Reserve duties. While respondent permitted Monroe
to exchange work days with other'employees on these occasions, it refused to accommodate his schedule when he could find no one with whom to exchange. On
those occasions, respondent considered Monroe on unpaid leave of absence, and
often paid overtime to substitute employees to work his shift. When this occurred,
petitioner worked and was paid for less than the customary forty-hour week.
10. The composition of the majority and dissent are of special interest in this
case. Justice Stewart delivered the majority opinion, in which Justices White,
Marshall, Rehnquist, and Stevens joined. Chief Justice Burger wrote the dissenting opinion in which Justices Brennan, Blackmun, and Powell joined.
11. Respondent Standard Oil Company attempted to distinguish West and
Monroe in its brief, on the basis of a collective bargaining agreement in the former
case, guaranteeing the right to work a forty-hour week. See Brief for Respondent
at 35-38, Monroe v. Standard Oil Co., 452 U.S. 549 (1981). The Court, however,
made only brief mention of this distinction. See 452 U.S. 549, 565 n.16 (1981). The
presence or absence of a contractual guarantee to work a forty-hour week is irrelevant to the issue of what protections are afforded by section 2021(b) (3). Both the
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ion concluded that the legislative history of section 2021(b) (3)
demonstrated no concern for "the problem of missed work hours,
let alone imposed any duty to 'take reasonable steps to accommodate the reservists' in this or any other respect."'1 2 The majority
interpreted section 2021(b) (3) as protecting employee-reservists
3
against only "discriminations like discharge or demotion."'
In the aftermath of Monroe, the issue remains whether any incident or advantage of employment is now protected under section
2021(b) (3). This Comment will examine the statutory history of
military reservists' rights, taking a critical view of the Supreme
Court's conclusion that Congress did not intend to accommodate
reservists in their civilian employment. The Comment will also illustrate how the Court failed to apply the Sixth Circuit's test that
section 2021(b) (3) requires employee-reservists to be treated
equally vis-A-vis their non-military co-workers. Finally, the Comment will consider the effects of the Supreme Court's holding on
American military posture and national defense.
District Court and the Sixth Circuit in Monroe found a forty-hour work week to be
a recognized incident of employment, established by the custom and practice at
respondent's plant. See 446 F. Supp. at 619; 613 F.2d at 645. The Supreme Court
did not refute that finding in its decision. The conclusion that may be drawn from
the Supreme Court's holding is that, while most employees at respondent's refinery are customarily entitled to work a forty-hour week, petitioner is not, because
of his Reserve obligations. This result is inconsistent with the majority's ruling
that reservist and non-military employees are to be treated equally.
Soon after the Court's decision in Monroe, the Department of Defense issued a
news release purporting to limit the effect of the holding to rotational shift
problems. See News Release, Ass't. Sec'y. of Defense, No. 300-81, June 29, 1981.
The news release stated that reservists continue to be protected from "discriminatory acts by employers... ." Id. This statement, however, reflects the issue addressed by this Comment, namely, the continued applicability of section
2021(b) (3) to inherent disadvantages associated with a Reserve commitment, -i.e.,
those disadvantages not effectuated by intentional employer misconduct.
If the majority in Monroe had wished to base its decision on the lack of a contractual right to work a forty-hour week, or limited its holding to rotational shift
employees, the case might have been disposed of summarily. Instead, the Court
interpreted section 2021(b)(3) in depth, and did not limit its holding to specific
subsets of the reservist-employee population.
12. 452 U.S. 549, 564 (1981).
13. Id. at 559.

STATUTORY HISTORY

Priorto the Enactment of Section 2021(b) (3) 14
The Selective Training and Service Act of 194015 was enacted at
the commencement of the nation's first peacetime draft. It established reemployment rights for military personnel for the first
time by providing for reinstatement of veterans to civilian employment with prior seniority, status, and pay. The Supreme
Court's first decision interpreting these provisions as they applied
to veterans stated that "[h] e who was called to the colors was not
to be penalized on his return by reason of his absence from his
civilian job."16
In 1951 the name of the Act was changed to the Universal Military Training and Service Act.17 In order to strengthen the
Reserves, Congress added active duty military personnel in training to the protected class. This required employers to grant
leaves of absence for periods of active duty for training, such as
the annual summer camp.
Two additional amendments strengthened reservists' reemployment protection. The Reserve Forces Act of 195518 provided that
volunteer reservists on active duty for training for periods of
greater than three months' duration were entitled to essentially
the same reemployment rights as inductees. The Act was again
amended in 196019 to equalize Reserve and National Guard reemployment rights.20 Additionally, reemployment rights were extended to reservists training for periods of less than ninety days
per year. Civilian employers were required to grant such reservists leaves of absence, and to restore them to their positions with
"such seniority, status, pay and vacation as [they would have had
if they had not been absent for such training]. 21 In 1967 the Act
was renamed the Military Selective Service Act.22
14. A brief survey of veterans' reemployment rights history precedes the

discussion of the statutory history of reservists' employment rights. The
protection afforded these two groups is congruous in many respects.
15. Pub. L. No. 783, 54 Stat. 885 (1940) (formerly codified at 50 U.S.C. app.

§ 308).
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

Fishgold v. Sullivan Drydock &Repair Corp., 328 U.S. 275, 284 (1946).
Pub. L. No. 51, § 1(a), 65 Stat. 75, 86-87 (1951).
Pub. L. No. 305, § 262(f), 69 Stat. 598, 602 (1955).
Pub. L. No. 86-632, § 9, 74 Stat. 467 (1960).
See 38 U.S.C. § 2024(f) (1976).
38 U.S.C. § 2024(d) (1976).
Pub. L. No. 90-40, § 1(1), 81 Stat. 100 (1967). Service members' rights were

codified at 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 451-473 (current version at 38 U.S.C. §§ 2011-2026
(1976)).

880

[VOL.

19: 877, 19821

Comments
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

Legislative History of Section 2021(b) (3)
Military reemployment rights were originally designed to ensure that a returning serviceman would return to essentially the
same job that he left, and be afforded prior status and pay. The
reemployment rights enacted to protect reservists and guardsmen
were fashioned from existing statutory language protecting veterans returning from a single, lengthy absence of several months or
years; however, this level of protection, as reflected in 38 U.S.C.
§ 2024(d), was not adequate to meet reservists' needs. Reservists'
and guardsmen's civilian jobs are not normally in jeopardy upon
their return from military service because of the short-term nature of their military obligations. Reservists, however, do encounter ongoing disadvantages in their daily civilian worklfe. This
results from the repetitive nature of their military commitmentsa problem not encountered by veterans who normally leave their
civilian employment only once. For example, opportunities for
advancement and even general perquisites may be adversely affected by the reservists' obligation to be absent from the workplace several times each year. To strengthen existing
reemployment protection for reservists, the Department of Labor
proposed legislation to the 89th Congress that later became sec-

tion 2021(b)

(3).23

At the congressional hearings, the subcommittee chairman of
the House Armed Services Committee described the proposal. as
"clearly establish[ing] the intent of Congress that employees
with Reserve obligations.., not be denied retention in [civilian]
employment, or other incident or advantage of employment because of such Reserve status.124
A Labor Department spokesman read a statement to the House
subcommittee that described section 2021(b) (3) as "designed to
enable reservists and guardsmen ... to retain their employment
and to enjoy all of the employment opportunities and benefits accorded to their co-workers who do not have military training obli23. See Proposed Amendment and Clarificationof the Reemployment Provisions of the UniversalMilitary Training and Service Act, and for other Purposes:
Hearingon H.R. 11509 Before the House Armed Services Committee, 89th Cong., 2d
Sess. 48 (1966). An in-depth review of key language in the legislative history of
section 2021(b) (3) follows in the text and is crucial to this Comment's analysis.
24. Subcomm. No. 3 Considerationof H.R. 11509 to Amend and Clarify the Reemployment Provisionsof the UniversalMilitary Training and Service Act andfor
otherPurposes, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 47 (1966) (remarks of Hon. Melvin Price).

gations." 25 With respect to an employer's obligation to an
employee-reservist, the spokesman stated that employers "have a
well-being is dismoral obligation to see that their economic
26
rupted to the minimum extent possible."
The only other witness to testify before the subcommittee was
from the Department of Defense. He explained the purposes of
those portions of the bill dealing with promotion and retention
rights, and said that the bill would "educate public opinion in the
vital importance of a trained Reserve to the safety of our
27
Nation."
Subcommittee members sought clarification of the bill as it
dealt with retention in employment. The subcommittee agreed
that the burden of proof would be on an employer charged with a
violation of the provision to show cause for discharging an em28
ployee-reservist.
The bill was reported upon favorably by the full Armed Serv30
ices Committee 29 and was passed without debate by the House.
The measure died, however, when the Senate failed to take action
in the 89th Congress.
In the 90th Congress the bill was reintroduced. 3 1 In his introductory remarks, the chairman of the House Armed Services Subcommittee stated that the purpose of the provision was to
"protect reservists and guardsmen from being disadvantaged in
employment because of their military obligations."3 2 The identical written statement of the Department of Labor that was offered
in the previous hearings3 3 was again read into the record. No one
questioned the Labor Department spokesman about section
2021(b) (3).
A written statement was also received by the subcommittee
from a veterans' advocate group spokesman. The veterans'
spokesman emphasized that "members of the National Guard and
the Reserves... should be afforded all the employment opportu25. Id. at 5312 (testimony of Mr. Hugh W. Bradley, Chief, Bureau of Reemploy-

ment Rights).
26. Id. at 5313.
27. Id. at 5315 (testimony of Rear Adm. Burton H. Shupper, U.S.N.).
28. Id. at 5320.
29. H.R. REP. No. 1303, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1966).
30. H.R. 11509, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., 112 CONG. REC. 5016-17 (1966).
31. H.R. 1093, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967).
32. Subcomm. No. 3 Considerationof H.R. 1093 to Amend and Clarify the Reemployment Provisionsof the UniversalMilitary Training and Service Act andfor

other Purposes, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 45 (1968) (remarks of Hon. Melvin Price)
[hereinafter cited as Hearings on H.R. 1093].
33. See supra note 25 and accompanying text. The reference to "moral obligation" cited supra text accompanying note 26 was deleted from the statement in the
1968 hearings on the proposed amendment.
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nities and benefits as those who do not have [military] training
34
obligations."
The report of the full House Armed Services Committee incorporated the testimony into a declaration that section 2021(b) (3)
was designed to "protect reservists and guardsmen from being
disadvantaged in employment because of their military obligations."35 The bill further was aimed at preventing employer discrimination by affording reservists "the same treatment as their
co-workers without military obligations." 36 The measure passed
37
the House.
The hearings before the Senate Armed Services Committee
consisted solely of a reading into the record of the Labor Department statement.38 In the committee's report to the full Senate,39
the descriptive term "disadvantage" 40 used by the House did not
appear. Instead, the purpose of the remedial provision was stated
solely in terms of prevention of intentional employer discrimination. This was a narrower interpretation of H.R. 1093 than that reported by the House Armed Services Committee. 41 The full
Senate concurred in a minor House amendment4 2 and the bill was
signed into law on August 17, 1968.43 It was later recodified with
the other military reemployment rights under the Vietnam Era
Veterans' Readjustment Act of 1974.44
Administrative Guidelines
The scant case law interpreting section 2021(b) (3)45 is supple-

mented by a Labor Department-published handbook entitled The
34. Hearingson H.R. 1093, supra note 32 (testimony of Mr. Austin Kerby, Director, National Economic Comm., The American Legion).
35. H.R. REP. No. 1303, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1968).
36. Id.
37. H.R. 1093, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., 114 CONG. REC. 11779 (1968).
38. Reemployment Provisions of the Universal Military Training and Service
Act and Retired Serviceman's Family ProtectionPlan: Hearing on H.R. 1093 Before
the Senate Armed Services Comm., 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1968).
39. S. REP. No. 1477, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1968).
40. See supra note 35.
41. Id.
42. This amendment was not relevant to section 2021(b)(3). H.RL 1093, 90th
Cong., 2d Sess., 114 CONG. REc. 24999, 25000 (1968).
43. Pub. L. No. 90-491, 82 Stat. 790 (1968) (formerly codified at 50 U.S.C. app.

§ 459(c)).
44. 38 U.S.C. §§ 2011-2026 (1976).
45. See, e.g., cases cited supra notes 3-9.

Veteran's Reemployment Rights Handbook.46 The handbook, still
in use today, declares that employers are not required to make

pay adjustments for reservist-employees during periods of active

duty.47 Nevertheless, the publication does cite in the form of situational analyses several problem areas that employees with military obligations might encounter in their civilian employment. 48
One hypothetical in particular suggests that if an employment

schedule conflicts with an employee's Reserve obligations, the
employer must rearrange the work schedule.4 9
THE

Monroe STANDARD

The Supreme Court adopted the Sixth Circuit test enunciated
in Monroe v. Standard Oil Co.50 that "section 2021(b) (3) . . .requires that reservists be treated equally or neutrally with their
fellow employees without military obligations."51 The Court then
failed to apply this standard. The majority declared that "the legislative history ... strongly suggests that Congress did not intend
employers to provide special benefits to employee-reservists not

generally made available to other employees."5 2 The Court concluded that section 2021(b) (3) was "enacted for the . . .limited
purpose of protecting the employee-reservist against discriminatory discharge and demotion, 5 3 while not preserving "all the 'incidents and advantages of employment' accorded ... to working

employees..

.. 54

Employee-reservists are already protected from discriminatory
46. OFFICE OF VETERANS' REEMPLOYMENT RIGHTS, DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, THE
VETERAN'S REEMPLOYMENT RIGHTS HANDBOOK (1970).

47. Id. at 113.
48. Id. at 115-19.
49. Id. at 119. The hypothetical reads as follows:
Maintenance Man M's reserve unit meets for training duty every Saturday
morning. His employer, W Window Company, has a Machine Operator vacancy which it offers M under its policy of always promoting the senior
Maintenance Man to such jobs, but since Machine Operators must often
work on Saturdays, it makes the offer conditional on M's getting himself
excused from the reserve meetings. M does not wish to jeopardize his status with the reserves, so W Company promotes another employee to the
Machine Operator job, and M objects.
Under the August 17, 196& amendments, W Company must grant M the
promotion he clearly would have had but for his reserve obligation, and
solve its Saturday staffing problem in some other way. It does not matter
whether that obligation was imposed on M by law or voluntarily assumed
by him.
Id. (emphasis added).
50. 613 F.2d 641 (6th Cir. 1980), allOd, 452 U.S. 549 (1981).
51. Id. at 646.
52. 452 U.S. 549, 561 (1981).
53. Id. at 559.
54. Id. at 563.
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discharge under 38 U.S.C. § 2024(d).55 What remains is a construction that section 2021(b)(3) only additionally protects employee-reservists and National Guardsmen from intentional
discriminatory demotion. The term "demotion," however, does
not appear in the sparse legislative history that the majority relies so strongly upon.5 6 The case law presents only one reported
case related to discriminatory demotion of an employee-reservist.5 7 In that case, the First Circuit disallowed the lateral transfer

of a reservist to a less desirable assignment because of his miltary obligations; the court also held that the requirements of section 2021(b) (3) are not satisfied by treating military obligations as
personal leaves of absence. 8 How then can the Supreme Court
justify the evisceration of section 2021(b) (3)?
Because the bill was not debated on the floor of Congress, the
three hearings and committee reports5 9 are the only indicators of
legislative intent.6 0 Moreover, there was no debate in either the
subcommittee or full committee. The written statement submitted by the Department of Labor 6 ' formed the crux of the testimony at all three hearings. The repetitive theme throughout the
hearings was that section 2021(b) (3) was designed to enable reservists to "enjoy all of the employment opportunities and benefits afforded to their co-workers who do not have military training
obligations."6 2 This suggests Congress intended that military reservists not be disadvantaged in their civilian employment because of service to country. This was the stated purpose in both
House Armed Services Committee reports.63
The Supreme Court apparently relied exclusively on the Senate
hearing of 1968 in reaching its conclusions. It was in this hearing
that references to disadvantages were deleted, and the bill's purpose was stated solely in terms of prevention of intentional employer discrimination. Reliance on the Senate report, however, is
unjustified. The Senate hearing was inconclusive; it consisted
55. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
56. See supra notes 23-42 and accompanying text.
57. See Carlson v. New Hampshire Dep't of Safety, 609 F.2d 1024 (1st Cir.
1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 913 (1980).
58. See id. at 1027.
59. See supra notes 24, 29, 32, 35, 38, 39 and accompanying text.
60. See Monroe v. Standard Oil Co., 452 U.S. 549, 557 n.10 (1981).
61. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
62. Id.
63. See supra notes 29 and 35 and accompanying text.

only of a reading into the record of the Labor Department statement.64 The Labor Department spokesman was not questioned
and no other witnesses testified. In contrast, the 1966 and 1968
House subcommittee hearings were substantive. Furthermore,
section 2021(b) (3) was a House-sponsored measure, and the Senate concurred in the House version of the bill.65 Therefore, any
interpretation of legislative history should be based on the House
subcommittee hearings and reports. This does not mean that the
legislative intent is clear and conclusive. Nonetheless, no fair
reading of the record supports the majority's conclusion in
Monroe that "Congress ... imposed [no] duty to 'take reason66
able steps to accommodate reservists' in ... any respect."
By labeling section 2021(b) (3) as anti-discriminatory, the Court
followed its recent precedent that affirmative action requirements
will not be read into federal statutes, but that such requirements
must be expressly stated.67 The majority rationalized its holding
in part by saying that if Congress intended to burden employers
under section 2021(b) (3), it could have done so expressly as it did
in section 403 of the 1974 Act. 68
Congress did not expressly require affirmative action under section 2021(b) (3), because the provision deals with more than intentional discrimination. It deals equally with employment
disadvantages that naturally accompany a military reserve commitment. What Congress envisioned under section 2021(b) (3)
was a flexible standard that would be amenable to change in light
of evolving contingencies not foreseeable at the time of its enactment, such as the all-volunteer forces concept that emerged in the
early 1970's.69
The Court has shown on other occasions that it recognizes
"Congress' desire to minimize the disruption in individuals' lives
resulting from the national need for military personnel." 70 By
failing to consider congressional intent in its restrictive holding,
64. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.

65. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
66. 452 U.S. 549, 564 (1981).
67. See, e.g., Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397 (1979) (refusing to read an affirmative action requirement into the Rehabilitation Act of
1973, Pub. L. No. 93-112, § 504 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 794)). Cf. Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63 (1977) (refusing to interpret Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e), as requiring an employer to alter existing
scheduling practices to accommodate an employee's religious beliefs).
68. See Monroe v. Standard Oil Co., 452 U.S. 549, 564 n.15 (1981), referring to 38
U.S.C. § 2012 (1976), a section which imposes affirmative action requirements on
employers with respect to disabled Vietnam era veterans.
69. See Proclamation No. 4360, 40 Fed. Reg. 14567 (1975), reprinted in 50
U.S.C.A. app. § 453 at 15 (West 1980).
70. Alabama Power Co. v. Davis, 431 U.S. 581, 583 (1977).
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the Monroe majority violated its own longstanding precedent that
reemployment rights statutes are "to be liberally construed for
,,71
the benefit of those who... serve their country ....
Petitioner Monroe asked for a reasonable attempt to provide
employee-reservists with parity with their fellow employees without active duty military commitments. The Court misinterpreted
the ambiguous legislative history as involving whether accommodation was required, when it only involved how accommodation
was to be undertaken. The Department of Labor, which initiated
action on section 2021(b) (3), apparently interpreted the section to
require work scheduling accommodation as a matter of right.72
The majority was quick to point out how '"requent absences from
work of an employee-reservist may affect productivity and cause
considerable inconvenience to an employer who must find alternative means to get the necessary work done," 73 without considering the burdens to the reservist in serving his country. As the
petitioner's brief in Monroe stated:
The requirement that military absences be placed in a special category is
not "preferential treatment;" a reservist is no better off, relative to his fellow employees, for having entered military service. Rather, such special

treatment of military absences is necessary in order to attempt to ensure
that veterans and reservists are no worse off for having entered military
service.7 4

THE AF ERMATH OF Monroe

One of the remaining ambiguities after Monroe involves the
continued applicability of section 2021(b) (3) to other judicially established incidents and advantages of employment. The rule now
is that section 2021(b) (3) only protects employee-reservists
against "discriminations like discharge or demotion, motivated
solely by reserve status." 75 Does section 2021(b) (3) still protect
an employee-reservist's right to receive paid holidays that his fellow employees receive while he undertakes mandatory military
training during the pay period in which the holiday falls? 7 6 Is it
discriminatory for an employer to deny a reservist the opportu71. Fishgold v. Sullivan Drydock & Repair Corp., 328 U.S. 275, 285 (1946); accord Coffy v. Republic Steel Corp., 447 U.S. 191, 196 (1980).
72. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
73. 452 U.S. 549, 565 (1981).
74. Brief for Petitioner at 7-8, Monroe v. Standard Oil Co., 452 U.S. 549 (1981).
75. 452 U.S. 549, 559 (1981).
76. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.

nity to make up missed overtime opportunities afforded to his fellow employees, because of his absence from work due to military
training obligations? 77 If, as the majority hints in dictum, section
2021(b) (3) entitles employee-reservists only to protection of benefits not "conditioned upon work requirements demanding actual
performance on the job,"78 then these incidents of employment
may no longer be protected. Such a condition, however, violates
the general standard of equality with respect to fellow employees
without military obligations. If employers were permitted to deny
a benefit on the ground that it is conditioned upon presence at
work, military reservist-employees would not be entitled to most
of the incidents and advantages of employment that section
2021(b) (3) seeks to protect. In essence, the courts would be penalizing a reservist for having to miss time on the job, while denying him the equality that the statute and the Monroe standard
demand. The lower federal courts may seek to avoid the confusion of the "equality" test, and rely instead on the language in
Monroe proscribing only discriminatory conduct such as discharge or demotion. 79 The application of this pseudo-test would
produce an inequitable result in that virtually no incident or advantage of employment would remain protected under section
2021(b) (3). Should this happen, the fear expressed by the Fifth
Circuit in West will be realized: section 2021(b) (3) will be "effectively annulled." 80 At some point, Congress must clarify its intent
in order to avoid the annulment of the protections afforded employee-reservists under section 2021(b) (3).
The Supreme Court could have deduced the legislative intent
behind section 2021(b) (3) by examining state and federal statutes
protecting governmental reservist-employees. As the majority in
Monroe noted, 81 the states are not pre-empted from providing
benefits in excess of those conferred under section 2021(b) (3).
Virtually every state currently provides statutory protection of
some kind for state employees with military Reserve or National
Guard obligations. 82 Most provide for paid military leaves of absence ranging from fourteen to thirty days annually. 83 Many do
77. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
78. 452 U.S. 549, 553 n.7 (1981).
79. The case law subsequent to Monroe indicates that they are doing precisely
that. See, e.g., Mendaloff v. Weiner, 109 L.R.R.M. 2166 (D. Md. 1981).
80. West v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 609 F.2d 147, 149 (5th Cir. 1980).
81. See Monroe v. Standard Oil Co., 452

U.S.

549, 563 n.14 (1981).

82. Interview with Lieutenant Col. Barbara Bacon, U.S. Army, Ombudsman,
National Comm. for Employer Support of the Guard and Reserve, Department of
Defense (Oct. 23, 1981).
83. See, e.g., CAL MU. & VET. CODE § 395 (Deering 1970) (thirty days annually); N.Y. MI. LAW § 242 (McKinney 1953) (thirty days annually).
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not limit continuance of civilian pay to the traditional annual
summer training camp, but provide the same protection for weekend drills as well. 84 The federal government provides the same
kind of protection to federal and District of Columbia employees. 85 This federal statute alone makes it difficult to justify the
Court's declaration in Monroe that Congress "did not intend employers to provide special benefits to employee-reservists not generally made available to other employees." 86 By analogy, it must
be concluded that Congress intended to afford some level of preferential treatment to employee-reservists in the private sector.
The requirement of reasonable accommodation is less onerous to
private-sector employers than the double compensation governmental employee-reservists receive, yet it is equitable to both employer and employee. Such a requirement conforms with
legislative intent and administrative interpretation of section
2021(b) (3).87 Unless Congress clarifies the requirements of section 2021(b) (3), private sector employee-reservists will be disadvantaged not only in relation to co-workers without military
commitments, but in relation to public sector employee-reservists
as well.
Finally, the Monroe decision will have an adverse effect on the
morale of employee-reservists. Reserve and National Guard
forces comprise approximately forty percent of the total strength
of the all-volunteer forces.8 8 Yet reservists do not enjoy the same
tax, salary, and retirement benefits that are enjoyed by their active duty counterparts. 8 9 Clearly the burdens and responsibilities
of a Reserve commitment justify reasonable job accommodation
on public policy grounds.
The courts have recognized the "increased reliance on Reserve
forces for the national defense of our country."90 Congress also is
cognizant of the indispensability of the Reserves, and it plans pol84. See, e.g., id.
85. See U.S.C. § 6323(a) (1976) (fifteen days annually).
86. 452 U.S. 549, 561 (1981).
87. See supra notes 35 and 49 and accompanying text.
88. Official Guard and Reserve Manpower Strengths and Statistics, Office of
the Deputy Ass't Sec'y of Defense (Reserve Affairs), REP. No. 1147-48 (Sept. 1981);

FY 82 (Jan. 19, 1981).
89. Interview with Mr. Lester Spear, Office of Veterans' Reemployment Rights,
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Department of Labor (Oct. 26, 1981).
90. Peel v. Florida Dep't of Transp., 443 F. Supp. 451, 459 (N.D. Fla. 1977), aff'd,
600 F.2d 1070 (5th Cir. 1979).

icy and military strategy around its reliance on a strong Reserve
force.9 1 Military leaders acknowledge that the greatest problem
in maintaining the Reserves is not recruitment, but retention, and
that the attitude of employers toward accommodation is a major
factor in retaining reservists. 92 The Supreme Court's restrictive
interpretation of section 2021(b) (3) in Monroe may eventually result in a significant exodus of highly trained middle management
officer and enlisted personnel from the Reserves and National
Guard, that will adversely affect not only national security directly, but also the viability of the all-volunteer forces concept
indirectly.
CONCLUSION

Section 2021(b) (3) was enacted to prevent employee-reservists
and national guardsmen from being disadvantaged in their civilian employment by their military obligations. The majority in
Monroe misread the legislative intent to say that only intentional
employer discrimination was proscribed by the statute. In doing
so, the Court declined to require even reasonable attempts by employers in private industry to accommodate employee-reservists'
work schedules. In sweeping dicta, the Court intimates that employers need not accommodate employee-reservists in any respect-effectively annulling the protection that section 2021(b) (3)
was designed to provide. The ramifications on national defense
will be manifested primarily by the exodus of highly trained personnel. In addition, the viability of the all-volunteer military force
concept could be jeopardized. Clarification of congressional intent is urgently needed.
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91. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 562, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 538 (1975) (refers to S. 2115
which enables the President to involuntarily order to active duty selected reservists without a declaration of war).
92. Interview with Major General Berwyn Fragner, U.S.A.R., Commanding
General, 63rd Army Reserve Command, Los Angeles, Cal. (Mar. 14, 1982).

